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ABSTRACT
Training neural networks to be certifiably robust is a powerful defense against
adversarial attacks. However, while promising, state-of-the-art results with certified
training are far from satisfactory. Currently, it is very difficult to train a neural
network that is both accurate and certified on realistic datasets and specifications
(e.g., robustness). Given this difficulty, a pressing existential question is: given a
dataset and a specification, is there a network that is both certified and accurate
with respect to these? While the evidence suggests "no", we prove that for realistic
datasets and specifications, such a network does exist and its certification can be
established by propagating lower and upper bounds of each neuron through the
network (interval analysis) – the most relaxed yet computationally efficient convex
relaxation. Our result can be seen as a Universal Approximation Theorem for
interval-certified ReLU networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to prove the existence of accurate, interval-certified networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Much recent work has shown that neural networks can be fooled into misclassifying adversarial
examples Szegedy et al. (2014), inputs which are imperceptibly different from images that the neural
network classifies correctly. Initial work on defending against adversarial examples revolved around
training networks to be empirically more robust, usually by including adversarial examples found
via attacks into the training dataset (Gu and Rigazio, 2015; Papernot et al., 2016; Zheng et al., 2016;
Athalye et al., 2018; Eykholt et al., 2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2018). However,
while experimental robustness can be practically useful, it does not provide safety guarantees. As a
result, much recent research has focused on establishing such guarantees by verifying that a network
is certifiably robust, typically by employing methods based on mixed integer linear programming,
SMT solvers and bound propagation (Gehr et al., 2018; Katz et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2018; Tjeng
et al., 2019).
Because the certification rates where far from satisfactory, specific training methods have been
recently developed which aim to produce networks that are certifiably robust (Mirman et al., 2018;
Wang et al., 2018; Wong and Kolter, 2018; Wong et al., 2018). Fundamentally, these methods work
by training the network with standard optimization applied to an over-approximation of the network
behavior on a given input region (the region is created around the concrete input point). That is, at a
high level, these techniques aim to discover specific weights which facilitate verification. Naturally,
the more precise the over-approximation used, the slower the training and certification are.
So far, some of the best results achieved on the popular MNIST (Lecun et al., 1998) and CIFAR10
(Krizhevsky, 2009) datasets have been obtained with the simple Interval approximation (Gowal
et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2019), which scales well at both training and verification time. However,
despite this progress, there are still substantial gaps between known standard accuracy, experimental
robustness, and certifiably robustness. For example, for CIFAR10, the best reported certifiably
robustness is 32.04% with an accuracy of 49.49% when using a fairly modest 8/255 sized l∞ region
(Gowal et al., 2018). This is despite the fact that the state-of-the-art non-robust accuracy for this
dataset is > 95% and the experimental robustness is > 50%. Given the size of this gap, a key question
then is: can certified training ever succeed or is there a fundamental limit?
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(a) Not certifiable network n1.
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(c) Certifiable network n2.
Figure 2: The ReLU networks n1 (Figure 2a) and n2 (Figure 2c) encode the same function f
(Figure 2b). Interval analysis fails certify that n1 does not exceed [0, 1] on [0, 1] while certification
succeeds for n2.
Figure 1: Illustration of
Theorem 1.1.
In this paper we take a step in answering this question by prov-
ing a result parallel to the Universal Approximation Theorem
(Cybenko, 1989; Hornik et al., 1989). We prove that for any con-
tinuous function f defined on a compact domain Γ ⊆ Rm and for
any desired level of accuracy δ, there exists a ReLU neural net-
work n which can certifiably approximate f up to δ using interval
bound propagation. As an interval is a fairly imprecise relaxation,
our result directly applies to more precise convex relaxations (e.g.,
Singh et al. (2019); Weng et al. (2018)).
Theorem 1.1 (Universal Interval-Certified Approximation, Figure 1). Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a compact
set and let f : Γ→ R be a continuous function. For all δ > 0, there exists a ReLU network n such
that for all boxes [a, b] in Γ defined by points a, b ∈ Γ where ak ≤ bk for all k, the propagation of
the box [a, b] using interval analysis through the network n, denoted n]([a, b]), approximates the set
[l, u] = [min f(B),max f(B)] ⊆ R up to δ,
[l + δ, u− δ] ⊆ n]([a, b]) ⊆ [l − δ, u+ δ]. (1)
We recover the classical universal approximation theorem (|f(x) − n(x)| ≤ δ for all x ∈ Γ) by
considering boxes [a, b] describing points (x = a = b).
Applicability of Theorem Because interval analysis propagates boxes, the theorem naturally
handles l∞ norm bound perturbations to the input. Other lp norms can be handled by covering the lp
ball with boxes. The theorem can be extended easily to functions f : Γ→ Rk by applying the theorem
component wise. We can apply our theorem to the problem of certified adversarial robustness by
instantiating the function f with the ground truth classifier of a dataset such as CIFAR10 (assuming f
is continuous). Then, our result guarantees that there exists a ReLU network n such that local stability
around the input x can be checked efficiently using interval analysis for all x in the data distribution.
We note that we do not provide a method for training a certified ReLU network – we aim to answer
an existential question and thus we focus on proving that a given network exists. Interesting future
work items would be to study the requirements on the size of this network and the inherent hardness
of finding it with standard optimization methods.
Universal Approximation is insufficient We now discuss why classical universal approximation
is insufficient for establishing our result. While classical universal approximation theorems state that
neural networks can approximate a large class of functions f , unlike our result, they do not state that a
property (e.g., local robustness) of the approximation n of f is actually certified with a scalable proof
method (e.g., interval bound propagation). If one uses a (non scalable) complete verifier instead, then
the standard Universal approximation theorem is sufficient.
To demonstrate this point, consider the function f : R→ R (Figure 2b) mapping all x ≤ 0 to 1, all
x ≥ 1 to 0 and all 0 < x < 1 to 1− x and two ReLU networks n1 (Figure 2a) and n2 (Figure 2c)
perfectly approximating f , that is n1(x) = f(x) = n2(x) for all x. For δ = 14 , the interval
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certification that n1 maps all x ∈ [0, 1] to [0, 1] fails because [ 14 , 34 ] ⊆ n]1([0, 1]) = [0, 32 ] 6⊆ [− 14 , 54 ].
However, interval certification succeeds for n2, because n
]
2([0, 1]) = [0, 1]. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to prove the existence of accurate, interval-certified networks.
2 RELATED WORK
After adversarial examples were discovered by Szegedy et al. (2014), many attacks and defenses have
been introduced (for a survey, see Akhtar and Mian (2018)). Initial work on verifying neural network
robustness used exact methods (Katz et al., 2017) on small networks, while later research introduced
methods based on over-approximation (Tjeng et al., 2019; Singh et al., 2018; Gehr et al., 2018; Tjeng
et al., 2019) aiming to scale to larger networks. As neural networks that are experimentally robust
need not be certifiably robust, there has been significant recent research on training certifiably robust
neural networks (Mirman et al., 2018; 2019; Wong and Kolter, 2018; Wong et al., 2018; Wang et al.,
2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018; Xiao et al., 2019). As these methods appear to have
reached a performance wall, several works have started investigating the fundamental barriers in the
datasets and methods that preclude the learning of a robust network (let alone a certifiably robust
one) (Khoury and Hadfield-Menell, 2018; Schmidt et al., 2018; Tsipras et al., 2019).
In our work, we focus on the question of whether neural networks are capable of approximating
functions in a interval certifiably robust manner. Gehr et al. (2018) presented the first system of using
abstract interpretation to analyze neural networks, and Mirman et al. (2018) leveraged the method for
training. Gowal et al. (2018) also found that rather imprecise interval analysis could be used to train
large, certifiably robust neural networks.
Feasibility Results with Neural Networks Historically, first results to show that a limited func-
tion set could be used to approximate another more general function set came from Weierstrass
(1885). This work showed that any continuous real valued function defined on an interval could be
approximated to arbitrary degree by a polynomial.
Early results on the expressiveness of neural networks, by Cybenko (1989) and Hornik et al. (1989),
stated the first versions of what is now known as the Universal Approximation Theorem. Cybenko
(1989) showed that networks using sigmoid activations could approximate continuous functions in
the unit hypercube, while Hornik et al. (1989) showed that even networks with only one hidden layer
are capable of approximating Borel measurable functions (a set larger than the set of continuous
functions).
More recent work has investigated the capabilities of ReLU networks. Arora et al. (2018), based on
Tarela and Martínez (1999), proved that every continuous piecewise linear function in Rm can be
represented by a ReLU network and He et al. (2018) reduce the number of neurons needed using
techniques from finite elements methods. Relevant to our work, Arora et al. (2018) introduced a
ReLU network representations of the min function. Further, we use a construction method that is
similar to the one for nodal basis functions given in He et al. (2018).
3 BACKGROUND
In this section we provide the concepts necessary to describe our main result.
Adversarial Examples and Robustness Verification Let n : Rm → Rk be a neural network,
which classifies an input x to a label t if n(x)t > n(x)j for all j 6= t. For a correctly classified
input x, an adversarial example is an input y such that x is imperceptible from y to a human, but is
classified to a different label by n.
Frequently, two images are assumed to be “imperceptible” if there lp distance is at most . The lp
ball around an image is said to be the adversarial ball, and a network is said to be -robust around x if
every point in the adversarial ball around x classifies the same. In this paper, we limit our discussion
to l∞ adversarial balls which can be used to cover to all lp balls.
The goal of robustness verification is to show that for a neural network n, input point x and label t,
every possible input in an l∞ ball of size  around x (written B∞ (x)) is also classified to t.
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Figure 3: Approximating f (Figure 3a) using a ReLU network n = ξ0 +
∑
k nk. The ReLU networks
nk (Figure 3c) approximate the N -slicing of f (Figure 3b), as a sum of local bumps (Figure 6).
Verifying neural networks with Interval Analysis The verification technique we investigate in
this work is interval analysis. We denote by B the set of boxes B = [a, b] ⊂ Rm for all m, where
ai ≤ bi for all i. Further for Γ ⊆ Rm we define B(Γ) := B ∩ Γ describing all the boxes in Γ. The
standard interval-transformations for the basic operations we are considering, namely +,−, · and the
ReLU function R (Gehr et al. (2018), Gowal et al. (2018)) are
[a, b] +] [c, d] = [a+ c, b+ d]
R]([a, b]) = [R(a), R(b)]
−][a, b] = [−b,−a]
λ ·] [a, b] = [λa, λb],
where [a, b], [c, d] ∈ B(R), and λ ∈ R≥0. Further, we used ] to distinguish the function f from its
interval-transformation f ]. To illustrate the difference between f and f ], consider f(x) := x− x
evaluated on x = [0, 1]. We have f([0, 1]) = 0, but f ]([0, 1]) = [0, 1]−# [0, 1] = [0, 1]+# [−1, 0] =
[−1, 1] illustrating the loss in precision that interval analysis suffers from.
Interval analysis provides a sound over-approximation in the sense that for all function f , the values
that f can obtain on [a, b], namely f([a, b]) := {f(x) | x ∈ [a, b]} are a subset of f ]([a, b]). If f is a
composition of functions, f = f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fk, then f ]1 ◦ · · · ◦ f ]k is a sound interval-transformer for f .
Further all combinations f of +,−, · and R are monotone, that is for [a, b], [c, d] ⊆ B(Rm) such that
[a, b] ⊆ [c, d] then f#([a, b]) ⊆ f#([c, d]) (Appendix A). For boxes [x, x] representing points f ]
coincides with f , f ]([x, x]) = f(x). This will later be needed.
4 PROVING UNIVERSAL INTERVAL-PROVABLE APPROXIMATION
In this section, we provide an explanation of the proof of our main result, Theorem 4.6, and illustrate
the main points of the proof. The full proof can be found in Appendix A.
The first step in the construction is to deconstruct the function f into slices {fk : Γ→ [0, δ2 ]}0≤k<N
such that that f(x) = ξ0 +
∑N−1
k=0 fk(x) for all x, where ξ0 is the minimum of f(Γ). We approx-
imate each slice fk by a ReLU network δ2 · nk. The network n approximating f up to δ will be
n(x) := ξ0 +
δ
2
∑
k nk(x). The construction relies on 2 key insights, (i) the output of
δ
2 · n]k can be
confined to the interval [0, δ2 ], thus the loss of analysis precision is at most the height of the slice,
and (ii) we can construct the networks nk using local bump functions, such that only 4 slices can
contribute to the loss of analysis precision, two for the lower interval bound, two for the upper one.
The slicing {fk}0≤k<5 of the function f : [−2, 2]→ R (Figure 3a), mapping x to f(x) = −x3 + 3x
is depicted in Figure 3b. The networks nk are depicted in Figure 3c. In this example, evaluating the
interval-transformer of n, namely n] on the box B = [−1, 1] results into n]([−1, 1]) = [−2, 6/5]
lies is within the δ = 85 bound of f([−1, 1]) = [−2, 2].
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Definition 4.1 (N -slicing (Figure 3b)). Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a closed m-dimensional box and let f : Γ→
R be continuous. The N -slicing of f is a set of functions {fk}0≤k<N defined by
fk : Γ→ R, x 7→

0 if f(x) ≤ ξk,
f(x)− ξk if ξk < f(x) < ξk+1,
ξk+1 − ξk if ξk+1 ≤ f(x),
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1},
where ξk := ξ0 + kN (ξN − ξ0), k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, ξ0 := min f(Γ) and ξN := max f(Γ).
To construct a ReLU network satisfying the desired approximation property (Equation (1)) if evaluated
on boxes in B(Γ), we need the ReLU network nmin capturing the behavior of min as a building
block (similar to He et al. (2018)). It is given by
nmin(x, y) :=
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)R

 1 1−1 −11 −1
−1 1
(xy
) .
With the ReLU network nmin, we can construct recursively a ReLU network nminN mapping
N arguments to the smallest one (Definition A.8). Even though the interval-transformation loses
precision, we can establish bounds on the precision loss of nmin]N sufficient for our use case
(Appendix A).
Now, we use the clipping function R[∗,1] := 1 − R(1 − x) clipping every value exceeding 1 back
to 1 (Figure 5) to construct the local bumps φc w.r.t. a grid G. G specifies the set of all possible
local bumps we can use to construct the networks nk. Increasing the fines of G will increases the
approximation precision.
Definition 4.2 (local bump, Figure 6). Let M ∈ N, G := {( i1M ), . . . , imM | i ∈ Zm} be a grid,
` = 2dlog2 2me+1 and let c = { il1M , i
u
1
M } × · · · × { i
l
m
M ,
ium
M } ⊆ G be a set of grid points describing the
corner points of a hyperrectangle in G. We define a ReLU neural network φc : Rm → [0, 1] ⊂ R w.r.t.
G by
φc(x) := R
nmin2m ⋃
1≤k≤m
{
R[∗,1](M · ` · (xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1),
R[∗,1](M · ` · ( i
u
k
M − xk) + 1)
} .
We will describe later how M and c get picked. A graphical illustration of a local bump for in two
dimensions and c = { il1M , i
u
1
M }×{ i
l
2
M ,
iu2
M } = {cll, clu, cul, cuu} is shown in Figure 6. The local bump
φc(x) evaluates to 1 for all x that lie within the convex hull of c, namely conv(c), after which φc(x)
quickly decreases linearly to 0.
By construction φc(x) decreases to 0 before reaching the next neighboring grid points N (conv(c)),
where N (x) := {g ∈ G | ||x − g||∞ ≤ 1M } \ {x} denotes the neighboring grid points of x and
similarly for N (U) := {N (x) | x ∈ U} \ U (Figure 4). The set N (conv(c)) forms a hyperrectangle
in G and is shown in Figure 6 using red squares. Clearly conv(c) ⊆ conv(N (c)).
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Figure 6: Local bump φc, where c contains the points cll, clu, cul, cuu}. The points in N (conv(c))
are depicted by the red squares.
Next, we give bounds on the loss of precision for the interval-transformation φ]c. We can show that
interval analysis can (i) never produce intervals exceeding [0, 1] and (ii) is precise if B does no
intersect conv((N)(c)) \ conv(c).
Lemma 4.3. For all B ∈ B(Rm), it holds that φ]c(B) ⊆ [0, 1] ∈ B and
φ]c(B) =
{
[1, 1] if B ⊆ conv(c)
[0, 0] if B ⊆ Γ \ conv(N (c)).
The formal proof is given in Appendix A. The next lemma shows, how a ReLU network nk can
approximate the slice fk while simultaneously confining the loss of analysis precision.
Lemma 4.4. Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a closed box and let f : Γ→ R be continuous. For all δ > 0 there exists
a set of ReLU networks {nk}0≤k<N of size N ∈ N approximating the N -slicing of f , {fk}0≤k<N
(ξk as in Definition 4.1) such that for all boxes B ∈ B(Γ)
n]k(B) =
{
[0, 0] if f(B) ≤ ξk − δ2
[1, 1] if f(B) ≥ ξk+1 + δ2 .
(2)
and n]k(B) ⊆ [0, 1].
It is important to note that in Equation (2) we mean f and not f ]. The proof for Lemma 4.4 is given
in Appendix A. In the following, we discuss a proof sketch.
Because Γ is compact and f is continuous, f is uniformly continuous by the Heine-Cantor Theorem.
So we can pick aM ∈ N such that for all x, y ∈ Γ satisfying ||y−x||∞ ≤ 1M holds |f(y)−f(x)| ≤ δ2 .
We then choose the grid G = ( ZM )
m ⊆ Rm.
Next, we construct for every slice k a set ∆k of hyperrectangles on the grid G: if a box B ∈ B(Γ)
fulfills f(B) ≥ ξk+1 + δ2 , then we add a minimal enclosing hyperrectangle c ⊂ G such that
B ⊆ conv(c) to ∆k, where conv(c) denotes the convex hull of c. This implies, using uniform
continuity of f and that the grid G is fine enough, that f(conv(c)) ≥ ξk+1. Since there is only a
finite number of possible hyperrectangles in G, the set ∆k is clearly finite. The network fulfilling
Equation (2) is
nk(x) := R[∗,1]
(∑
c∈∆k
φc(x)
)
,
where φc is as in Definition 4.2. The nk are depicted in Figure 3c.
Now, we see that Equation (2) holds by construction: For all boxesB ∈ B(Γ) such that f ≥ ξk+1 + δ2
on B exists c′ ∈ ∆k such that B ⊆ conv(c′) which implies, using Lemma 4.3, that φ]c′(B) = [1, 1],
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hence
n]k(B) = R
]
[∗,1](φ
]
c′(B) +
∑
c∈∆k\c′
φ]c(B)) ∀c 6= c′ : φ]c(B) ⊆ [0, 1](Lemma 4.3)
= R][∗,1]([1, 1] + [p1, p2]) [p1, p1] ∈ B(R≥0)
= R][∗,1]([1 + p1, 1 + p2])
= [1, 1].
Similarly, if f(B) ≤ ξk − δ2 holds, then it holds for all c ∈ ∆k that B does not intersectN (conv(c)).
Indeed, if a c ∈ ∆k would violate this, then by construction, f(conv(c)) ≥ ξk+1, contradicting
f(B) ≤ ξk − δ2 . Thus φ]c(B) = [0, 0], and hence n](B) = [0, 0].
Theorem 4.5. Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a closed box and let f : Γ → R be continuous. Then for all δ > 0,
exists a ReLU network n such that for all B ∈ B(Γ)
[l + δ, u− δ] ⊆ n](B) ⊆ [l − δ, u+ δ],
where l := min f(B) and u := max f(B).
Proof. Pick N such that the height of each slice is exactly δ2 , if this is impossible choose a slightly
smaller δ. Let {nk}0≤k<N be a series of networks as in Lemma 4.4. Recall that ξ0 = min f(Γ). We
define the ReLU network
n(x) := ξ0 +
δ
2
N−1∑
k=0
nk(x). (3)
Let B ∈ B(Γ). Thus we have for all k
f(B) ≥ ξk+2 ⇔ f(B) ≥ ξk+1 + δ2
Lemma 4.4⇒ n]k(B) = [1, 1] (4)
f(B) ≤ ξk−1 ⇔ f(B) ≤ ξk − δ2
Lemma 4.4⇒ n]k(B) = [0, 0]. (5)
Let p, q ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} such that
ξp ≤ l = min f(B) ≤ ξp+1 (6)
ξq ≤ u = max f(B) ≤ ξq+1, (7)
Figure 7: Illustration of the proof
for Theorem 4.5.
as depicted in Figure 7. Thus by Equation (4) for all
k ∈ {0, . . . , p− 2} it holds that n]k(B) = [1, 1] and similarly,
by Equation (5) for all k ∈ {q + 2, . . . , N − 1} it holds that
n]k(B) = [0, 0]. Plugging this into Equation (3) after splitting the
sum into three parts leaves us with
n](B) = ξ0 +
δ
2
p−2∑
k=0
n]k(B) +
δ
2
q+1∑
k=p−1
n]k(B) +
δ
2
N−1∑
k=p+1
n]k(B)
= ξ0 + (p− 1)[ δ2 , δ2 ] + δ2
q+1∑
k=p−1
n]k(B) + [0, 0].
Applying the standard rules for interval analysis, leads to
n](B) = [ξp−1, ξp−1] + δ2
q+1∑
k=p−1
n]k(B),
where we used in the last step, that ξ0 + k δ2 = ξk. For all terms
in the sum except the terms corresponding to the 3 highest and
lowest k we get
n]k(B) = [0, 1] ∀k ∈ {p+ 2, . . . , q − 2}. (8)
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Indeed, from Equation (6) we know that there is x ∈ B such that f(x) ≤ ξp+1 = ξp+2 − δ2 , thus by
Lemma 4.4 n]k([x, x]) = [0, 0] for all p+ 2 ≤ k ≤ q− 2. Similarly, from Equation (7) we know, that
there is x′ ∈ B such that f(x) ≥ ξq = ξq−1 + δ2 , thus by Lemma 4.4 n]k([x′, x′]) = [1, 1] for all
p+ 2 ≤ k ≤ q − 2. So n]k(B) is at least [0, 1], and by Lemma 4.4 also at most [0, 1]. This leads to
n](B) = [ξp−1, ξp−1] + δ2
p+1∑
k=p−1
n]k(B) +
δ
2 ((q − 2)− (p+ 2) + 1)[0, 1] + δ2
q+1∑
k=q−1
n]k(B)
= [ξp−1, ξp−1] + δ2
p+1∑
k=p−1
n]k(B) + [0, ξq−1 − ξp+2] + δ2
q+1∑
k=q−1
n]k(B).
We know further, that if p+ 3 ≤ q, than there is an x ∈ B such that f(x) ≥ ξp+3 = ξp+2 + δ2 , hence
similar as before n]p+1([x, x]) = [1, 1] and similarly n
]
p([x, x]) = [1, 1] and n
]([x, x]) = [1, 1]. So
we know, that δ2
∑p+1
k=p−1 n
]
k(B) includes at least [3
δ
2 , 3
δ
2 ] and at the most [0, 3
δ
2 ]. Similarly, there
exists an x′ ∈ B such that n]q−1([x′, x′]) = [0, 0], n]q([x′, x′]) = [0, 0] and n]q+1([x′, x′]) = [0, 0].
This leaves us with
[3 δ2 , 3
δ
2 ] ⊆ δ2
p+1∑
k=p−1
n]k(B) ⊆ [0, 3 δ2 ]
[0, 0] ⊆ δ2
q+1∑
k=q−1
n]k(B) ⊆ [0, 3 δ2 ],
If p+ 3 > q the lower bound we want to prove becomes vacuous and only the upper one needs to be
proven. Thus we have
[l + δ, u− δ] ⊆ [ξp+2, ξp−1] ⊆ n](B) ⊆ [ξp−1,ξq+2 ] ⊆ [l − δ, u+ δ],
where l := min f(B) and u := max f(B).
Theorem 4.6 (Universal Interval-Provable Approximation). Let Γ ⊂ Rm be compact and f : Γ→ Rd
be continuous. For all δ ∈ Rm≥0 exists a ReLU network n such that for all B ∈ B(Γ)
[l + δ, u− δ] ⊆ n](B) ⊆ [l − δ, u+ δ],
where l, u ∈ Rm such that lk := min f(B)k and uk := max f(B)k for all k.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of using Theorem 4.5 and the Tietze extension theorem to
produce a neural network for each dimension d of the codomain of f .
Note that Theorem 1.1 is a special case of Theorem 4.6 with d = 1 to simplify presentation.
5 CONCLUSION
We proved that for all real valued continuous functions f on compact sets, there exists a ReLU
network n approximating f arbitrarily well with the interval abstraction. This means that for arbitrary
input sets, analysis using the interval relaxation yields an over-approximation arbitrarily close to
the smallest interval containing all possible outputs. Our theorem affirmatively answers the open
question, whether the Universal Approximation Theorem generalizes to Interval analysis.
Our results address the question of whether the interval abstraction is expressive enough to analyse
networks approximating interesting functions f . This is of practical importance because interval
analysis is the most scalable non-trivial analysis.
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A PROOFS FOR THE UNIVERSAL INTERVAL-CERTIFIED APPROXIMATION
Lemma A.1 (Monotonicity). The operations +,− are monotone, that is for all
[a1, b1], [a2, b2], [c1, d1], [c2, d2] ∈ B(R) such that [a1, b1] ⊆ [a2, b2] and [c1, d2] ⊆ [c2, d2]
holds
[a1, b1] +
] [c1, d1] ⊆ [a2, d2] +] [c2, d2]
[a1, b1]−] [c1, d1] ⊆ [a2, d2]−] [c2, d2]
[a1, b1] ·] [c1, d1] ⊆ [a2, d2] ·] [c2, d2].
Further the operation ∗ and R are monotone, that is for all [a, b], [c, d] ∈ B(R) and for all λ ∈ R≥0
such that [a, b] ⊆ [c, d] holds
λ ·] [a, b] ⊆ λ ·] [c, d]
R]([a, b]) ⊆ R]([c, d]).
Proof.
[a1, b1] +
] [c1, d1] = [a1 + c1, b1 + d1] ⊆ [a2 + c2, b2 + d2] = [a2, d2] +] [c2, d2]
[a1, b1]−] [c1, d1] = [a1 − d1, b1 − c1] ⊆ [a2 − d2, b2 − c2] = [a2, d2]−] [c2, d2]
λ ·] [a, b] = [λa, λb] ⊆ [λc, λd] = [λc, λd]
R]([a, b]) = [R(a), R(b)] ⊆ [R(c), R(d)] = R]([c, d]).
Definition A.2 (N -slicing). Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a compact m-dimensional box and let f : Γ → R be
continuous. The N -slicing of f is a set of functions {fk}0≤k≤N−1 defined by
fk : Γ→ R, x 7→

0 if f(x) ≤ ξk,
f(x)− ξk if ξk < f(x) < ξk+1,
ξk+1 − ξk otherwise,
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1},
where ξk := kN (ξmax − ξmin), k ∈ {0, . . . , N}, ξmin := min f(Γ) and ξmax := max f(Γ).
Lemma A.3 (N -slicing). Let {fk}0≤k≤N−1 be the N -slicing of f . Then for all x ∈ Γ we have
f(x) := ξ0 +
∑N−1
k=0 fk(x).
Proof. Pick x ∈ Γ and let l ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} such that ξl ≤ f(x) ≤ ξl+1. Then
ξ0 +
N−1∑
k=0
fk(x) = ξ0 +
l−1∑
k=0
fk(x) + fl(x) +
N−1∑
k=l+1
fk(x) = ξ0 +
l−1∑
k=0
(ξk+1 − ξk) + fl(x)
= ξl + fl(x) = f(x).
Definition A.4 (clipping). Let a, b ∈ R, a < b. We define the clipping function R[∗,b] : R→ R by
R[∗,b](x) := b−R(b− x).
Lemma A.5 (clipping). The function R[∗,b] sends all x ≤ b to x, and all x > b to b. Further,
R][∗,b]([a
′, b′]) = [R[∗,b](a′), R[∗,b](b′)].
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Proof. We show the proof for R[a,b], the proof for R[∗,b] is similar.
x < b⇒ R[∗,b](x) = b−R(b− x) = b− b+ x = x
x ≥ b⇒ R[∗,b](x) = b−R(b− x) = b− 0 = b
Next,
R][∗,b]([a
′, b′]) = b−] R](b−] [a′, b′])
= b−] R](b+] [−b′,−a′])
= b−] R]([b− b′, b− a′])
= b−] [R(b− b′), R(b− a′)]
= b+] [−R(b− a′),−R(b− b′)]
= [b−R(b− a′), b−R(b− b′)]
= [R[∗,b](a′), R[∗,b](b′)].
Definition A.6 (nmin). We define the ReLU network nmin : R2 → R by
nmin(x, y) :=
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)R

 1 1−1 −11 −1
−1 1
(xy
) .
Lemma A.7 (nmin). Let x, y ∈ R, then nmin(x, y) = min(x, y).
Proof. Because nmin is symmetric in its arguments, we assume w.o.l.g. x ≥ y.
nmin(x, y) =
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)R

 1 1−1 −11 −1
−1 1
(xy
)
=
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)R
 x+ y−x− yx− y
−x+ y

If x+ y ≥ 0, then
nmin(x, y) =
1
2
(x+ y − x+ y) = y.
If x+ y < 0, then
nmin(x, y) =
1
2
(x+ y − x+ y) = y.
Definition A.8 (nminN ). For all N ∈ N≥1, we define a ReLU network nminN defined by
nmin1(x) := x
nminN (x1, . . . , xN ) := nmin(nmindN/2e(x1, . . . , xdN/2e), nmindN/2e+1(xdN/2e+1, . . . , xN )).
Lemma A.9. Let [a, b], [c, d] ∈ B(R). Then nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) = nmin]([c, d], [a, b]) and
nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) =

[c+ a−b2 , d+
b−a
2 ] if d ≤ a
[a+ c−d2 , b+
d−c
2 ] if a ≤ d and b < c
[a+ c− b+d2 , b+d2 ] if a ≤ d and b ≥ c
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Proof. The symmetry on abstract elements is immediate. In the following, we omit some of ] to
improve readability.
nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) =
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)R]

 1 1−1 −11 −1
−1 1
([a, b][c, d]
)
=
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)R]

 [a, b] + [c, d]−[a, b]− [c, d][a, b]− [c, d]
−[a, b] + [c, d]


=
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)R]

 [a+ c, b+ d][−b− d,−a− c][a− d, b− c]
[c− b, d− a]


=
1
2
(1 −1 −1 −1)
 [R(a+ c), R(b+ d)][R(−b− d), R(−a− c)][R(a− d), R(b− c)]
[R(c− b), R(d− a)]

=
1
2
([R(a+ c), R(b+ d)]− [R(−b− d), R(−a− c)]
− [R(a− d), R(b− c)]− [R(c− b), R(d− a)])
=
1
2
([R(a+ c), R(b+ d)] + [−R(−a− c),−R(−b− d)]
+ [−R(b− c),−R(a− d)] + [−R(d− a),−R(c− b)])
=
1
2
([R(a+ c)−R(−a− c), R(b+ d)−R(−b− d)]
+ [−R(b− c)−R(d− a),−R(a− d)−R(c− b)])
Claim: R(a+c)−R(−a−c) = a+c. If a+c > 0 then−a−c < 0 thus the claim in this case. Indeed:
If a+ c ≤ 0 then −a− c ≥ 0 thus R(a+ c)−R(−a− c) = −R(−a− c) = −(−a− c) = a+ c.
Similarly R(b+ d)−R(−b− d) = b+ d.
So the expression simplifies to
nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) =
1
2
([a+ c, b+ d] + [−R(b− c)−R(d− a),−R(a− d)−R(c− b)])
We proceed by case distinction:
Case 1: b− c ≤ 0: Then a ≤ b ≤ c ≤ d:
nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) =
1
2
([a+ c, b+ d] + [a− d, b− c])
=
1
2
([a+ c+ a− d, b+ d+ b− c])
= [a+ c−d2 , b+
d−c
2 ]
Case 2: a− d ≥ 0: Then c ≤ d ≤ a ≤ b. By symmetry of nmin equivalent to Case 1. Hence
nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) = [c+ a−b2 , d+
b−a
2 ].
Case 3: a− d < 0 and b− c > 0:
nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) =
1
2
([a+ c, b+ d] + [c− b− d+ a, 0])
=
1
2
([a+ c+ c− b− d+ a, b+ d])
= [a+ c− b+d2 , b+d2 ]
14
Thus we have
nmin]([a, b], [c, d]) =

[a+ c−d2 , b+
d−c
2 ] if b ≤ c
[c+ a−b2 , d+
b−a
2 ] if d ≤ a
[a+ c− b+d2 , b+d2 ] if a < d and b > c
Definition A.10 (neighboring grid points). Let G be as above. We define the set of neighboring grid
points of x ∈ Γ by
N (x) := {g ∈ G | g ∈ ||x− g|| ≤ 1M } \ {x}.
For U ⊂ Rm, we define N (U) := {N (x) | x ∈ U} \ U .
Definition A.11 (local bump). Let M ∈ N, G := ( ZM )m, ` = 2dlog2 2me+1 and let c = { i
l
1
M ,
iu1
M } ×
· · · × { ilmM , i
u
m
M } ⊆ G. We define a ReLU neural network φc : Rm → [0, 1] w.r.t. the grid G by
φc(x) := R
nmin2m ⋃
1≤k≤m
{
R[∗,1](M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1), R[∗,1](M`(
iuk
M − xk) + 1)
}
Lemma A.12. It holds:
φc(x) :=

0 if x /∈ conv(N (c))
1 if x ∈ conv(c)
min
(
0,
⋃m
k=1{M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1} ∪ {M`( i
u
k
M − xk) + 1}
)
otherwise.
Proof. By case distinction:
• Case x /∈ N (c). Then there exists k, such that either xk < i
l
k−1
M or xk >
iuk+1
M . Then
M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1 or M`(
iuk
M − xk) + 1 is less or equal to 0. Hence
φc(x) = 0.
• Case x ∈ conv(c). Then for all k holds ilkM ≤ xk ≤ i
u
k
M . Thus M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1 ≥ 1 and
M`(
iuk
M − xk) + 1 ≥ 1 for all k Hence
φc(x) = 1.
where α ≥ 1.
• Case otherwise: For all x exists a k such that M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1 or M`(
iuk
M − xk) + 1 is
smaller or equal to all other arguments of the function min and smaller or equal to 1. If the
smallest element is smaller than 0, then φc(x) will evaluate to 0, otherwise it will evaluate
to M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1 or M`(
iuk
M − xk) + 1. Thus we can just drop R and R[∗,1] from the
equations and take the minimum also over 0:
φc(x) = R
(
min
m⋃
k=1
{
R[∗,1](M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1), R[∗,1](M`(
iuk
M − xk) + 1)
})
= min
(
0,
m⋃
k=1
{(M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1)} ∪ {(M`( i
u
k
M − xk) + 1)}
)
= min
m⋃
k=0
{M`(xk − i
l
k
M ) + 1} ∪ {M`( i
u
k
M − xk) + 1}
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Lemma A.13. Let [u1, 1], . . . , [uN , 1] be abstract elements of the Interval Domain B. Then
nmin]N ([u1, 1], . . . , [uN , 1]) = [u1 + · · ·uN + 1−N, 1].
Proof. By induction. Base case: Let N = 1. Then nmin]1([u1, 1]) = [u1, 1]. Let N = 2. Then
nmin]2([u1, 1], [u2, 1]) = [u1 + u2 − 1, 1].
Induction hypothesis: The property holds for N ′ s.t. 0 < N ′ ≤ N − 1.
Induction step: Then it also holds for N :
nmin]N ([u1, 1], . . . , [uN , 1]) = nmin
](nmin]dN/2e([u1, 1], . . . , [udN/2e, 1]),
nmin]N−dN/2e([udN/2e+1, 1], . . . , [uN , 1]))
= nmin]([u1 + · · ·+ udN/2e + 1− dN/2e, 1],
[udN/2e+1 + · · ·uN + 1−N + dN/2e, 1])
Lemma A.9
= [u1 + · · ·+ uN + 2− dN/2e −N + dN/2e − 1, 1]
= [u1 + · · ·+ uN + 1−N, 1]
Lemma A.14. Let [a, b], [u, 1] ∈ B(R≤1). Then
nmin]([a, b], [u, 1]) ⊆ [a+ u−12 , b+12 ]
Proof.
nmin]([a, b], [u, 1]) =
{
[a+ u−12 , b+
1−u
2 ] if b ≤ u
[a+ u− b+12 , b+12 ] if b ≥ u
If b ≤ u then b+ 1−u2 ≤ b+ 1−b2 = b+12 . If u ≤ b then a+ u− b+12 ≥ a+ u− u+12 = a+ u−12 . So
nmin]([a, b], [u, 1]) ⊆ [a+ u−12 , b+12 ].
Lemma A.15. Let N ∈ N≥2, let [u1, 1], . . . , [uN−1, 1], [uN , d] ∈ B(R) s.t. b ≤ 1 be abstract
elements of the Interval Domain B. Furthermore, let H(x) := 1+x2 . Then there exists a u ∈ R s.t.
nmin]N ([u1, 1], . . . , [uN−1, 1], [uN , d]) ⊆ [u,Hdlog2Ne+1(d)]
Proof. By induction: Let N = 2:
nmin]2([u1, 1], [u2, d])
Lemma A.14
= [a+ u1−12 , H(d)]
Let N = 3:
nmin]3([u1, 1], [u2, 1], [u3, d]) = nmin
](nmin]([u1, 1], [u2, 1]), [u3, d])
= nmin]([u1 + u2 − 1, 1], [u3, d])
⊆ [u3 + u1+u2−22 , H(d)]
nmin]3([u1, 1], [a, b], [u2, 1]) = nmin
]
3([u3, d], [u1, 1], [u2, 1])
= nmin](nmin]([u3, d], [u1, 1]), [u2, 1])
= nmin]([u3 + u1−12 , H(d)], [u2, 1])
⊆ [u3 + u1+u2−22 , H2(d)]
So nmin]3([u3, d], [u1, 1], [u2, 1]) is always included in [u3 +
u1+u2−2
2 , H
2(d)].
Induction hypothesis: The statement holds for all 2 ≤ N ′ ≤ N − 1.
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Induction step: Then the property holds also for N :
nmin]N ([uN , d], [u1, 1], . . . , [uN−1, 1]) = nmin
](nmin]dN/2e([uN , d], [u1, 1], . . . , [udN/2e−1, 1]),
nmin]N−dN/2e([udN/2e, 1], . . . , [uN−1, 1]))
= nmin]([u′, Hdlog2dN/2ee+1(d)], [u′′, 1])
⊆ nmin]([u′, Hdlog2N/2e+1(d)], [u′′, 1])
= nmin]([u′, Hdlog2N−log2(2)e+1(d)], [u′′, 1])
= nmin]([u′, Hdlog2N−1e+1(d)], [u′′, 1])
= nmin]([u′, Hdlog2Ne(d)], [u′′, 1])
= [u′′′, Hdlog2Ne+1(d)]
and similarly for other orderings of the arguments.
Lemma A.16. Let H(x) := 1+x2 . For all N ∈ N>0, we have that d ≤ 1− 2N implies HN (d) ≤ 0.
Proof. By induction. N = 1: Then H(1− 2) = 1+1−22 = 0
Induction hypothesis. The statement holds for all N ′ such that 0 < N ′ ≤ N .
Induction step: N + 1: d ≤ 1− 2N :
HN+1(d) ≤ HN+1(1− 2N+1) = HN (H(1− 2N+1)) = HN ( 1+1−2N+12 ) = HN (1− 2N ) ≤ 0
Lemma A.17. For all boxes B ∈ B(Rm), we have
φ]c(B) =
{
[1, 1] if B ⊆ conv(c)
[0, 0] if B ⊆ Γ \ conv(N (c))
Furthermore, φ]c(B) ⊆ [0, 1].
Proof. Let φc be a local bump and let B = [a, b] ∈ B(Rm). Let [r1k, s1k], [r2k, s2k] ∈ B(R) such that
M`([ak, bk]− i
l
k
M ) + 1 = [r
1
k, s
1
k] and M`(
iuk
M − [ak, bk]) + 1 = [r2k, s2k].
• If [a, b] ⊆ conv(c): Then 1 ≤ r1k and 1 ≤ r2k for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Thus
φ]c([a, b]) = R
](nmin]2m{R][∗,1]([rpk, spk])}(p,k)∈{1,2}×{1,...,m})
= R](nmin]2m{[1, 1]}(p,k)∈{1,2}×{1,...,m})
= [1, 1]
• If [a, b] ⊆ Γ \ conv(N (c)): Then there exists a (p′, k′) ∈ {1, 2} × {1, . . . ,m} such that
sp
′
k′ ≤ 1 − 2dlog2Ne+1. Using Lemma A.16 and Lemma A.15, we now that there exists a
u ∈ R s.t.
φ]c([a, b]) = R
](nmin]2m{R][∗,1]([rpk, spk])}(p,k)∈{1,2}×{1,...,m})
= R](nmin]2m{[R[∗,1](rpk), R[∗,1](spk)]}(p,k)∈{1,2}×{1,...,m})
⊆ R](nmin]2m{[R[∗,1](rpk), 1]}(p,k)6=(p′,k′) ∪ {[rp
′
k′ , s
p′
k′ ]})
⊆ R]([u, 0])
= [0, 0]
For any [a, b] ∈ B(Γ) we have φ]c([a, b]) ⊆ [0, 1] by construction.
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Lemma A.18. Let Γ ⊂ Rm be a closed box and let f : Γ → R be continuous. For all δ > 0
exists a set of ReLU networks {nk}0≤k≤N−1 of size N ∈ N approximating the N -slicing of f ,
{fk}0≤k≤N−1 (ξk as in Definition A.2) such that for all boxes B ∈ B(Γ)
n]k(B) =
{
[0, 0] if f(B) ≤ ξk − δ2
[1, 1] if f(B) ≥ ξk+1 + δ2 .
and n]k(B) ⊆ [0, 1].
Proof. Let N ∈ N such that N ≥ 2 ξmax−ξminδ where ξmin := min f(Γ) and ξmax := max f(Γ). For
simplicity we assume Γ = [0, 1]m. Using the Heine-Cantor theorem, we get that f is uniformly
continuous, thus there exists a δ′ > 0 such that ∀x, y ∈ Γ.||y − x||∞ < δ′ ⇒ ||f(y)− f(x)|| < δ2 .
Further, let M ∈ N such that M ≥ 1δ′ and let G be the grid defined by G := ( ZM )m ⊆ Rm.
Let C(B) be the set of corner points of the closest hyperrectangle in G confining B ∈ B(Γ). We
construct the set
∆k := {C(B) | B ∈ B(Γ) : f(B) ≥ ξk+1 + δ2}.
We claim that {nk}0≤k≤N−1 defined by
nk(x) := R[∗,1]
(∑
c∈∆k
φc(x)
)
satisfies the condition.
Case 1: Let B ∈ B(Γ) such that f(B) ≥ ξk+1 + δ2 . Then for all g ∈ N (B) holds fk(g) = δ2. By
construction exists a c′ ∈ ∆k such that B ⊆ conv(c′). Using Lemma 4.3 we get
n]k(B) = R
]
[∗,1]
(∑
c∈∆k
φ]c(B)
)
= R][∗,1]
φ]c′(B) + ∑
c∈∆k\c′
φ]c(B)

= R][∗,1] ([1, 1] + [p1, p2]) = [1, 1],
where [p1, p2] ∈ B(R≥0). Indeed, by case distinction:
Case 2: Let B ∈ B(Γ) such that f(B) ≤ ξk − δ2 . Then for all g ∈ N (B) holds fk(g) = 0. Further,
B ∩ conv(N (c)) = ∅ for all c ∈ ∆k because G is fine enough. Using Lemma 4.3 we obtain
n]k(B) = R
]
[∗,1]
(∑
c∈∆k
φ]c(B)
)
= R][∗,1]([0, 0]) = [0, 0].
By construction we have n]k(B) ⊆ [0, 1].
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